

Технократичне урядування та модернізація: теоретичні принципи та емпіричний досвід взаємозв'язку

У дослідженні проведено науковий аналіз теоретичних принципів та емпіричного досвіду взаємозв'язку технократичного урядування і модернізації в різних країнах світу. Запропоновано концептуальне визначення понять технократія, технократичний уряд, технократичне урядування та модернізація. Виокремлено й деталізовано сценарії та особливості позитивної і негативної кореляції технократичного урядування і модернізації. Виявлено типи технократичної модернізації.

Ключові слова: політичний режим, технократія, технократичний уряд, технократичне урядування, модернізація, демократія, авторитаризм.

Technocratic governance and modernization: theoretical principles and empirical experience of relationship

The article is dedicated to scientific analysis of theoretical principles and empirical experience of relationship between technocratic governance and modernization. The author proposed the conceptual definitions of technocracy, technocratic government, technocratic governance and modernization, singled out and detailed scenarios and features of positive/negative correlation between technocratic governance and modernization, discovered types of technocratic modernization.

Keywords: government (regime), technocracy, technocratic government, technocratic governance, modernization, democracy, authoritarianism.

The idea of technical government/administrative/public decisions as the rational ones, which are in the basis of efficient economic development and management, has induced the appearance of the scientific conceptions, concerning the appropriateness of governance organization, according to the principles of technocracy, in particular as to the search for ways of public (including political and economic) development modernization. On the one hand, the reason is brilliant success of some countries of the world, which have managed to modernize themselves, applying the technocratic model of democratic or non-democratic governance in their political, institutional and reformational experience. On the other hand, not all countries, which have announced and evaluated (or at least just tried to test) the technocratic model of governance, managed to achieve

significant or even some results in modernization of social, political and economic processes. Consequently, within the theoretical and methodological context, which is amplified with experience of empirical correlation, the correlation between technocratic governance and modernization is not always absolutely clear, especially the relationship between technocratic governance and politics, in the light of taking and realizing decisions, which promote modernization. That is why, investigation of theoretical principles and empirical experience of relationship between technocratic governance and modernization for current political science is of great concern and high priority, but is not comprehensively and thoroughly disclosed.

However, in the course of theoretical description of the problem, concerning relationship between technocracy, technocratic governance and modernization, especially in the context of disclosure and comparative analysis of various attributes of such relationship, we cannot but operate available methodological and empirical data, derived from western scientific sources, on the grounds of which principal and initial methods of evaluation of relationship between technocratic governance and modernization have been formed. Among scholars, who have studied the processes of evaluation and fleshing out current scientific problem, one should single out: M. Cotta and L. Verzichelli¹, P. Donmez², T. Bellows³, J. Bresnan⁴, G. Peters⁵, B. T. Khoo⁶, T. Shiraishi⁷, P. Silva⁸, J. Yoon⁹, G. Njalsson¹⁰, M. Centeno¹¹, E. Bryld¹², J. MacDougall¹³, B. Schneider¹⁴, R. Putnam¹⁵, M. Muramatsu

¹ M. Cotta, L. Verzichelli, Ministers in Italy: notables, partymen, technocrats and mediamen, „South European Society and Politics” 2002, vol 7, nr 2, s. 117–152.

² P. Donmez, Understanding Depoliticisation as Process and Governing Strategy in the Turkish Context, Warwick 2010.

³ T. Bellows, Bureaucracy and development in Singapore, „The Asian Journal of Public Administration” 1985, vol 7, s. 55–69.

⁴ J. Bresnan, Managing Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy, Wyd. Columbia University Press 1993.

⁵ G. Peters, Bureaucrats and Political Appointees in European Democracies: Who’s Who and Does It Make Any Difference?, [w:] A. Farazmand (ed.), Modern Systems of Government: Exploring the Role of Bureaucrats and Politicians, Wyd. Sage Publications 1997.; G. Peters, Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy, „Comparative Politics” 1979, vol 11, nr 3, s. 339–358.

⁶ B. Khoo, No insulation: politics and technocracy’s troubled trajectory, „IDE Discussion Paper” 2010, nr 236.

⁷ T. Shiraishi, Technocracy in Indonesia: A Preliminary Analysis, „RIETI Discussion Paper Series” 2006, vol 05-E-008.

⁸ P. Silva, State Capacity, Technocratic Insulation, and Government-Business Relations in South Korea and Chile, Wyd. Nueva Serie FLACSO 2000.; P. Silva, Towards Technocratic Mass Politics in Chile? The 1999-2000 Elections and the ‘Lavin Phenomenon’, „European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies” 2001, vol 70, s. 25–39.

⁹ J. Yoon, The Technocratic Trend and Its Implication in China, Presented at the Science & Technology in Society: An International Multidisciplinary Graduate Student Conference, Washington, DC, March 31-April 1, 2007.

¹⁰ G. Njalsson, From autonomous to socially conceived technology: toward a causal, intentional and systematic analysis of interests and elites in public technology policy, „Theoria: a journal of political theory” 2005, vol 108, s. 56–81.

¹¹ M. Centeno, The New Leviathan: The Dynamic and Limits of Technocracy, „Theory and Society” 1993, vol 22, s. 307–335.

¹² E. Bryld, The Technocratic Discourse: Technical Means to Political Problems, „Development in Practice” 2000, vol 10, nr 5, s. 700–705.

¹³ J. MacDougall, The Technocratic Model of Modernization: The Case of Indonesia’s New Order, „Asian Survey” 1976, vol 16, nr 12, s. 1166–1183.

¹⁴ B. Schneider, The material bases of technocracy: Investor confidence and neoliberalism in Latin America, [w:] M. Centeno, P. Silva (eds.), The Politics of Expertise in Latin America, Wyd. St Martin’s Press 1998, s. 77–95.

¹⁵ R. Putnam, Elite transformation in advanced industrial societies: An empirical assessment of the theory of technocracy, „Comparative Political Studies” 1997, vol 10, s. 388–412.

and E. Krauss¹⁶, I. Takashi and J. Purnendra¹⁷, J. Gunnell¹⁸, J. Straussman¹⁹, F. Marangoni²⁰, R. Tirtosudarmo²¹, Y. Bangura²², M. Thandika²³ and others.

Among the research, offered by the above mentioned scholars, the definitions of technocracy, technocratic governance and modernization, as well as some theoretical and empirical characteristics and attributes of their relationship are genuinely comprehensible. In particular, technocracy is *interpreted* as the way of governance and administration, which is based on the concrete grounds for application of special skills and techniques and the regime of decision-making on the basis of realization of expert recommendations²⁴. Thus, the government can be called technocratic (in the wide (system) and narrow (institutional) sense of the notion “government”), despite the way of its formation (parliamentary or non-parliamentary), which is, first of all, based not on political and ideological/party patterns of its activity, but on non-party/non-ideological and expert parameters of its purpose and functions²⁵. That is why, technocratic governance can be attractive and even necessary in case of

¹⁶ M. Muramatsu, E. Krauss, Bureaucrats and politicians in policymaking: The case of Japan, „American Political Science Review“ 1984, vol 78, nr 1, s. 126–146.

¹⁷ T. Inoguchi, J. Purnendra, Japanese Politics Today: Beyond Karaoke Democracy, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1997.

¹⁸ J. Gunnell, The Technocratic Image and the Theory of Technocracy, „Technology and Culture“ 1982, vol 2, nr 3, s. 392–416.

¹⁹ J. Straussman, The Limits of Technocratic Politics, Wyd. Edison 1978.

²⁰ F. Marangoni, Technocrats in Government: The Composition and Legislative Initiatives of the Monti Government Eight Months into its Term of Office, „Bulletin of Italian Politics“ 2012, vol 4, nr 1, s. 135–149.

²¹ R. Tirtosudarmo, Indonesia and Nigeria, 1965-1985: Structural factors, technocracy and the politics of rural development, Paper prepared for the first plenary meeting of Tracking Development Leiden, 25-28 June 2008.

²² Y. Bangura, Intellectuals, Economic Reform and Social Change: Constraints and Opportunities in the Formation of a Nigerian Technocracy, „CODESRIA Monograph Series“ 1994, vol 1, nr 94.

²³ M. Thandika, Incentives, Governance, and Capacity Development in Africa, „African Issues“ 2002, vol 30, nr 1, s. 15–20.

²⁴ Such definition of technocracy is an averaged one, because the problem of technocratic governance is very wide and diverse. Technocracy cannot be viewed within one concrete investigation, moreover as there are various approaches to interpretation of technocracy both within the frames of modern science and in the context of approved political practice. Firstly, technocracy should be interpreted as the theory and “innovational” movement, which stands for control over labor resources, reformation of financial institutions and reorganization of the social system, based on the results, provided by technologists and engineers. Secondly, this is the system of governance with application of technocratic theory. Thirdly, this is any practical usage of the theory of technocratic governance. That is why, it is evidently, that at the same time the following definitions of technocracy may be correct: 1) theory or system of society, according to which, state governance is under the control of scientists, engineers and experts; 2) mechanism of state governance under the control of scientists, engineers and expert; 3) state of development, which is determined and regulated, according to the mentioned principle; 4) system of governance, based on the rule of technical experts; 5) society, which is marked by domination of people with specialized skills, mainly engineers; 6) governance of “technicians”, who are guided by imperatives of technologies; 7) forms/methods of governance (administration), when engineers, scientists, medical workers and other technical experts strictly control the process of decision-making in the appropriate (including political) spheres; 8) administrative and political predominance of state elite and allied institutions in a society, which try to dictate single paradigm of politics, based on instrumental and rational techniques of power implementation. See in detail.: Collins English Dictionary, Wyd. William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd. 2009.; Online Etymology Dictionary, Wyd. Douglas Harper 2010.; Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, źródło <http://www.britannica.com/> [odczyt: 01.02.2015].; T. Veblen, The Engineers and the Price System, Wyd. Batoche Books 2001.; M. Centeno, The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy, “Theory and Society” 1993, vol 22, nr 3, s. 314.

²⁵ Correspondingly, O. Protsyk states, that all technocratic governments, at least regarding the way they are formed and function on the basis of non-party/non-ideological and/or expert patterns, should be divided into two types – technocratic/non-party governments with ministers-experts (technocrats) and technocratic/non-party governments without ministers-experts (technocrats). The former can be formed fully on the basis of non-party or partially party constituents (minister-expert or technocrat can at the same time represent party-ideological motives), but the crucial meaning in this context belongs to minister's ability to solve efficiently the tasks, raised by the ministry or the government. The latter in the process of their initialization and formation is determined by the primary perspective on exclusion of any (or all) party-ideological components, as the ability to solve effectively the tasks, raised for the minister, ministry and government, is defined on the grounds of non-party composition. It means, that all technocratic/non-party governments with ministers-experts (technocrats) or technocratic/non-party governments without mi-

“general weakness of great institutions’ power and non-effectiveness of governments, burdened with financial problems and complexity of state institutions”²⁶. Technically, ministers and members of any technocratic government are not professional politicians (or the political element of their careers goes to the background) or even members of political parties. On the contrary, in the process of technocratic government formation the crucial role is played by the experts (or technocrats) in the spheres of activity of separate ministries or departments²⁷. The important role in the context of political apathy belongs to the head of the government. Typically, one can speak of technocratic government in its pure form, when the position of the government executive (which can be congruent with the position of the head of the state) is also technocratic, non-political, non-party or non-ideological, and not less, than two thirds of ministers are technical servants. Together with this, there are cases, when the position of the government executive in the state is occupied by the leader of the biggest party, but the composition of the government is a technocratic/non-party and an expert one.

One can speak of technocratic governance in case of application of scientific and expert methods of important political decision-making and solution of social and economic problems. In this light traditional economic, political and philosophical approaches are determined. Besides, it is initially stipulated, that the model of technocratic governance is, by definition, less democratic, than the idea of political (ideological) governance. The point is, that technical or political qualities of technocrats are determined on the basis of their special knowledge and productivity. That is why, technocratic governance is immanently characterized by such patterns as: “meritocracy” – the process of decision-taking on the basis of actual knowledge, and “oligarchy” the process of decision-taking on the basis of appropriated capital and financial influence. Consequently, technocratic governance in this or that way is always based on representation of concrete, specific interest groups in the political process or in the process of state administration. Alongside with this, as G. Njalsson states, technocratic governance is realized on the grounds of a cognitive set of directives, as a result of which, it (more often than political/ideological governance) is, first of all, aimed at solving the problems of governance. It results in the fact, that hypothetically (not including the human factor) technocratic governance, less than political or ideological governance, is oriented on the interests of certain social and lobbying groups,

nisters-experts (technocrats) can be a logical projection of party/ideological patterns of cabinets formation, but the positions are occupied not by the party functionaries, but by non-party representatives of parties, which either form or support governments. The ministers of technocratic/non-party governments can have no connections with political parties or authoritative institutions, which form or support governments. Besides, it is necessary to mention, that technocratic governments can be permanent or temporary. The general rule is that the more democratic the political regime is, the higher chances are, that the technocratic government will be temporary. On the contrary, authoritarianisation of the political regime, leads to the fact, that the phenomenon and practice of technocratic/non-party governments formation become fixed.

²⁶ G. Peters, *Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy*, „Comparative Politics“ 1979, vol 11, nr 3, s. 339–358.

²⁷ The classic example is the occurrence, when the minister of Finance is a person with academic economic education, who has been working for many years in the IMF, for instance, and also has never run for the elective positions and have not actively participated in the elections. But in this case, we speak only of an example. There is no direct requirement, that ministers are economist by profession. The point is that they can be political scientists, lawyers, doctors etc.

and but, on the contrary, is based on dichotomy of all officials/executives of “econocrats” and “bureaucrats”²⁸. Namely this, leads to theorization, that technocratic governance itself (due to the nature of personnel management) promotes social, political and economic modernization and system reforms as well, at least in the context, that technocratic governments themselves can implement “painful reforms”, which are necessary to save this or that country from crisis or collapse or contribute to its modernization. Along with this, the thought, that ministers of any technocratic cabinet, being more able to sustain lobbying group pressure and ready to implement unpopular economic, political and social reforms, become more effective, than any party or ideological cabinets, only in the questions of initiating of reforms, but not their implementation or immutability, is postulated²⁹. The point is, that initializing modernization reforms, technical or technocratic governments do not depend or have little dependence on political parties, which usually are not ready to pay for their electoral losses for institutionalization of political, economic or social changes³⁰.

At the same time, the category of “*modernization*” and its partial synonym “*development*” require additional study within the context of establishment and development of comparative political science and theory of international relationships. V. Gel'man argues, that in political discourse, modernization is interpreted in different ways: from introduction of technological innovations to the “substitution of all bad by all good”. In social sciences, modernization means the transition process of some countries into “modern societies”, which presupposes the fact of borrowing and creation of own basic institutions on the model of western patterns³¹. It is of interest, that modernization encloses both social and economic (industrialization, urbanization, improvement of education level, mobility, expansion of mass media, lowering of inequality level), political (spread of political rights and liberties, establishment of electoral competitiveness, party systems, separation of powers) and sociocultural constituents (transformation of mass values and goals of mass behavior). First of all, modernization operates with the category “development”. It is the process of lowering absolute poverty and inequality and achievement of full realization of human potential; combined process of capital accumulation, increase in people's earnings per capita, improvement of people's skills, and also acceptance of new technological style and other related social and economic changes. Nowadays, two perspectives of modernization are single out – economic (social-economic) and political. S. Lipset (the founder of the so-called “liberal school of modernization”) links up patterns of economic growth with democratization processes, proves mutual interdependence between political

²⁸ G. Njalsson, From autonomous to socially conceived technology: toward a causal, intentional and systematic analysis of interests and elites in public technology policy, „Theoria: a journal of political theory” 2005, vol 108, s. 56–81.

²⁹ S. Haggard, R. Kaufman, The Political economy of democratic transitions, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1995.

³⁰ But as a result of this, technocratic governance possess minimal “mandate of responsibility” to parties (in particular in the context of parliamentary way of government formation). However, usually the key “agents” of political responsibility for technocratic governance are the countries' leaders.

³¹ V. Tsapf, Teoriya modernizatsiyi i razlichie putey obshchestvennoho razvitiya, „Sotsiolohicheskiye issledovaniya” 1998, nr 8, s. 14–26.

and social-political modernization. It means, that in general capitalistic development contributes to prosperity of democracy on the basis of class structure transformation. But the events, which took place in the so-called “new autocracies” (mainly countries of Latin America and South-East Asia), have made to reconsider the paradigm of interrelation between regimes and development. S. Huntington (who is the founder of the so-called “conservative school of modernization”) has analyzed numerous negative consequences of political modernization, which are related to the instability of regimes, crisis of governance, growth of conflicts and political violence. That is why, the factor for successful modernization is the ability of government institutions to ensure control over the process and minimize the uncontrolled participation of society in general, and its separate groups in particular, in political life. Due to this A. Leftwich has proposed the rule of modernization: democratic development is an evolutionary phenomenon and a satellite of the present time, and that is why democracy is a result of social and economic development, but not its precondition.

The acceptance of the previous conclusion, concerning correlation between technocratic government and governance, and modernization is possible in consideration of the fact, that in modern world of scientific inventions and informational pace, the idea of technical/expert decisions mainly influenced the growth of manufacturing/industrial management effectiveness both in the West (mostly in the USA, and to the less extent in Western and Eastern Europe and Latin America), and in the East (to the greatest extent in Japan, South Korea and other industrialized countries in Asia). Taking this into consideration, technocratic governance is often estimated as attractive, even in those countries, where it has not been fully or partially implemented into practice. G. Wilson explains this by the fact, that the condition for administrative decision-taking on the basis of technocracy and technocratic governance is the point, that this process occurs with the help of professionals, armed with the knowledge “about natural iron laws and can adapt to them”³². This logic of theoretical interrelation between technocratic governance and modernization derives from F. Bacon’s argumentation that knowledge is paradigm of power. Besides, methodologically in favor of positive correlation between technocratic governance and modernization attest concepts of “bureaucracy rationalization”, proposed by M. Weber, of “new order” (T. Veblen), of “end of ideology” (D. Bell, E. Shils, S. Lipset, J. La Palombara, R. Lane). To the large extent such conclusions are consonant with some social theories and hypothesis, viz. elite technocracy (S. Lakoff, H. Brooks, P. Piccard, N. Calder, D. Schooler, P. Bereano, G. Boyle), bureaucratic technocracy (J. Meynaud, D. Price), neo-Marxism (M. Horkheimer, H. Marcuse, J. Habermas and others), Taylorism (A. Ranney, J. Kasson) and others.

It means, that positive correlation between technocratic governance and modernization is possible on the basis of coordination between political will and *technocratic rationalization*, which being formal, consists in the ability to carry out calculation and estimation within the frames of administrative or any other decision-taking processes. Thus, success of modernization depends on whether

³² G. Wilson, Beyond the Technocrat? The Professional Expert in Development Practice, “Development and Change” 2006, vol 37, nr 3, s. 505.

there is political will for rational technocrats' activities, even despite the fact, if such actions contradict politicians' various ideological convictions and values. In fact it proves, that the desire to reform and modernize certain system, to provide technocratic governance, must be based on indifference to politics, which for sure will have political consequences. Taking this into account, it becomes clear why the government in the process of executive authority realization can stay "impassive" and politically indifferent, being, at the same time, collegial and even caused by political necessity. Thereby, it does not matter what the motives for technocratic government existence or formation are. There are cases, when technocratic government is formed politically or apolitically, by the head of the country or parliament, in direct dependence on constitutionally prescribed mechanism of government formation, from constitutional/formal and political/actual formats of governance systems, types of political regimes. Much more problems in the course of evaluating prospects of development and modernization arise, when the idea of technocratic governance serves only as the "guise" for stabilization and establishment of non-democratic political regimes, which accentuating on the technocratic intentions of the government, in fact do not carry out modernization and system reformation.

In order to comprehend reliable correlation between technocratic/non-party governance and prospects and consequences of modernization, we offer to distinguish a set of countries, which have used or use practice or rhetoric of technocratic governance. The instances of constant (or often repeated) technocratic governance and permanent formation of technocratic governments (technocratic/non-party governments with ministers-experts and technocratic/non-party governments without ministers-experts) are or in their days were: Japan (after WWII, since the 50s of the 20th century), Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines (mainly in 60s-90s of the 20th century, and some of them still nowadays), the United Arab Emirates (since 90s of the 20th century), Chile (1973–1990), Spain (1959–1973), Greece (1950–1973), Brazil (1968–1973), China (since 80s of the 20th century), Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia (since 90s of the 20th century), Georgia (in 2004–2012) etc. The examples of accidental (unsteady) technocratic governance and nonpermanent formation of technocratic governments are: Italy (Prime-Ministers L. Dini and M. Monti), Iceland (Prime-Minister B. Thordarson), Finland (Prime-Ministers R. von Fieandt, R.R. Lehto, R. Kuuskoski, T. Aura, K. Liinamaa), Bulgaria (Prime-Ministers L. Berov, R. Indzhova, M. Raykov), Greece (Prime-Ministers Y. Grivas, X. Zolotas, L. Papademos, P. Pikrammenos), Czech Republic (Prime-Minister J. Fischer), Portugal (Prime-Minister A. N. da Costa) etc.³³

Such a list of cases proves, that technocratic governance and technocratic governments (with or without experts) are not distinctive of democratic political regimes, which, for the most part,

³³ H. Döring, P. Manow, Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies, źródło: <http://www.parlgov.org/> [odczyt: 01.02.2015].

are socially, economically and politically modernized (Japan is a rather interesting exception³⁴)³⁵. However, the examples of steady technocratic governance are or were peculiar of nondemocratic (authoritarian and hybrid) political regimes. That is why, according to the conception and theoretical assumptions, they, first of all, must be modernized. In general, it seems, that not many countries, which apply or have applied the technique of technocratic/non-party government, managed to modernize themselves. Nearly always, countries with democratic and hybrid political regimes (for instance Japan and Georgia) have been modernized. Less often models of technocratic governance have been modernized in authoritarian political regimes. Among them, the most successful in the context of modernization have become, for example: Indonesia, Chile, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand etc.³⁶. Often authoritarian regimes, which on the basis of the technocratic governance model, have managed to modernize themselves, are called regimes of authoritarian development, modernization authoritarianism. The result of technocratic modernization within the social and economic sphere under the conditions of authoritarian regimes is usually the creation of foundations for political modernization and democratization, but in most cases after the collapse of technocratic governance models, which became the precondition for transition of authoritarianism towards democratization. On the contrary, countries, which use the technique of non-party governance without attraction of experts-technocrats, have not been able to modernize themselves or have partially undergone the process of modernization. The instances are: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan and so on. China is a specific exception. Not going deep into the specificity of technocratic (non-party) governance in every mentioned country in detail, we single out general patterns of how technocratic governance and prospects and consequences of modernization correlate with each other.

Firstly, technocratic modernization takes place in democratic, but more often in strict authoritarian political regimes, which contribute to the rapid capitalistic growth and development. These regimes are endowed with the centralized structure of authority and strong impulse towards elimination and subordination of all potential centres of “antagonistic powers”. Among the reasons, why namely authoritarian political regimes promote technocratic modernization, one can single out:

³⁴ T. Pempel, *Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1998.; J. Chalmers, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975*, Wyd. University of California 1982.

³⁵ R. Aron, *Alternation in Government in the Industrialized Countries*, „Government and Opposition“ 1982, vol 17, s. 3–21.; M. Cotta, L. Verzichelli, *Ministers in Italy: notables, partymen, technocrats and mediamen*, „South European Society and Politics“ 2002, vol 7, nr 2, s. 117–152.; F. Müller-Rommel, *Parteienregierungen in Mittel- und Osteuropa: Empirische Befunde im Ländervergleich 1990 bis 2008*, „Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen“ 2008, vol 39, nr 4, s. 810–831.; O. Protsyk, *Ministerial appointments in new democracies: evidence from Eastern Europe*, 2011 IPSA-ECPA Conference, Sao Paulo, Brazil.

³⁶ See, for instance: T. Shiraiishi, *Technocracy in Indonesia: A Preliminary Analysis*, „RIETI Discussion Paper Series“ 2006, vol 05-E-008.; P. Silva, *Towards Technocratic Mass Politics in Chile? The 1999-2000 Elections and the ‘Lavin Phenomenon’*, „European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies“ 2001, vol 70, s. 25–39.; P. Silva, *State Capacity, Technocratic Insulation, and Government-Business Relations in South Korea and Chile*, Wyd. Nueva Serie FLACSO 2000.; T. Bellows, *Bureaucracy and development in Singapore*, „The Asian Journal of Public Administration“ 1985, vol 7, nr 1, s. 55–69.; B. Khoo, *No insulation: politics and technocracy’s troubled trajectory*, „IDE Discussion Paper“ 2010, nr 236.; J. Yoon, *The Technocratic Trend and Its Implication in China*, Science & Technology in Society: An International Multidisciplinary Graduate Student Conference, Washington, DC, March 31 – April 1, 2007.

active suppression of consumption, and effective mobilization of the masses for industrialization; technocratic rationality, which is revealed in the fact, that the process of achievement of the goals at the early stage of industrialization (due to reliable infrastructure, great volumes of capital, imported technologies, extension of industrial bases of production, and relative simplicity of production at low prices) is more efficient; isolation from pressure on the side of social interests and coordinated policy (limited political variations on the basis of the fact, that the regime isolates itself from social interests pressure, avoids critical influence of “electoral cycle”, as a result of which economic and political confidence in the agents of modernization); ideology of development (authoritarian regime can create national ideology, where the need for hard work martyred for economic development is determined, as a result of which the authority of separate “moral values of the state” – national discipline, national unity, importance of stable national development, determination of politics is strengthened). It is very often believed, that under the conditions of authoritarianism, technocratic governance contributes to modernization only in the case, when there is a unity of bureaucratic type of authoritarianism and experimentalism. In this context the unique type of legitimacy of authority is formed, which is based on the faith in “revolutionary project”. If it happens, then the value of choice between political regimes falls away: the main point is, that “the state of development” must be realized, which consists in the low level of corruption and high level of stability, participation in various international and political markets etc. The precondition for technocratic modernization is the concept of “integrated economy” construction, which provides a specific set of social ties that bound the state and society. As a result of this, institutionalized channels of discussion political and economic process goals are ensured and it becomes clear, that modernization is possible despite political regime, but it depends on the “unifying nature” of relations within the country. That is why, modernization occurs in places, where it is possible to avoid main risks of the main agents of modernization: problems of capital attraction, invention of newish products and technologies, search for new markets, preparation of qualified engineers and employees etc. It mainly contributes to liberalization of political regime, and under the conditions of authoritarianism, liberalization serves as an unsteady balance, as it usually (in future) leads to the gradual transformation of authoritarianism into democracy. It means, that when technocratic governance influences social and economic modernization of authoritarian regimes, then, in prospect, it will inevitably influence political modernization of such regimes. But if technocratic governance under the conditions of authoritarianism does not ensure effectiveness, then this regime loses its legitimacy, which is believed to be the only source for “justification” of retaining the power. On the other hand, a typical characteristic of authoritarian-technocratic modernization lies in the fact, that the regime, where it takes place, ends with a critical event, the cause for which is considered to be formation of modern social and economic, and maybe political institutions, which is the reason for transition from authoritarianism to democracy (though after that the process of modernization goes on).

Historical and political experience regulates the existence of several models of positive relationship between technocratic governance and modernization, especially in the former and current regimes of an authoritarian type. For instance, in Singapore (period of “Lee Kuan Yew’s regime”, 1959–1990) was realized the reformist/moderate plan of authoritarian and technocratic modernization, which occurred in the context of personified authoritarianism: the efficient bureaucratic apparatus was created “from the scratch”, and with a “strict hand” deep economic transformations³⁷, which changed the “city-state” into the world’s financial and economic center, were implemented. Similar plan was realized in some other countries and regions of Asia, in particular in Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan (which, along with Singapore are traditionally named “the Asian tigers” or “the Asian dragons”) in 1960-1990, when they showed annual economic growth, at the level of more than 7%. After that, Hong Kong and Singapore have become international financial centers, and South Korea and Taiwan – world’s leaders in production of informational technologies. Their experience, according to the reformist/moderate plan of authoritarian and technocratic modernization, is copied by other authoritarian countries in Asia, in particular the so-called “the Asian tiger cubs” (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) and the United Arab Emirates (since 1990s, starting with modernization of Dubai)³⁸. In Chile (A. Pinochet’s regime, 1973–1990) a forceful plan of authoritarian and technocratic modernization was tested: opposition was successfully suppressed, liberals and reformers (the group “Chicago boys”) got freedom of actions in the economic sphere, the ideas and principles of neoliberalization and monetarism were combined, (“shock therapy”, accelerated and thorough process of private property development, attraction of foreign investment, limitation of state’s role in the sphere of economy) and national reality in Chile, as a result of which, due to “suppression of people” (measures of terror, frustration and dispossession) and economic reforms, modernization of the economic and social system took place in the country, and soon afterwards in the context of military and personified authoritarianism appeared the notion of “Chilean economic miracle”. Specificity of Chile lies in the fact, that

³⁷ T. Bellows, *Bureaucracy and Development in Singapore*, „Asian Journal of Public Administration“ 1985, vol 7, nr 1, s. 55–69.; P.-S. Seet, C. Hampden-Turner, *Technocrats and Technopreneurs – Power Paradoxes in Singapore’s National Innovation System*, Paper presented at 4th International Critical Management Studies Conference (Technology and Power Stream), 4-6 July 2005.

³⁸ T. Shiraishi, *Technocracy in Indonesia: A Preliminary Analysis*, „RIETI Discussion Paper Series“ 2006, nr 05-E-008.; J. MacDougall, *The Technocratic Model of Modernization: The Case of Indonesia’s New Order*, „Asian Survey“ 1976, vol 16, nr 12, s. 1166–1183.; B. Anderson, *Les Eruditions Indonesiens et l’Ordre Nouveau. Politique de ideologie du Mahasiswa Indonesia (1966–1974)*, „Pacific Affairs“ 1986, vol 59, nr 3, s. 541–542.; V. Hadiz, *Workers and the State in New Order Indonesia*, Wyd. Routledge 1997, s. 63.; W. Bello, D. Kinley, E. Elinson, *Development Debacle: The World Bank in the Philippines*, Wyd. Institute for Food and Development Policy 1982.; A. MacIntyre, K. Jayasuriya, *The Politics and Economics of Economic Policy Reform in South-east Asia and the South-west Pacific*, [w:] A. MacIntyre, K. Jayasuriya (eds.), *The Dynamics of Economic Policy Reform in South-east Asia and the South-west Pacific*, Wyd. Oxford University Press, 1992, s. 1–9.; A. Laothamatas, *The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Thailand: A Political Explanation of Economic Success*, [w:] A. MacIntyre, K. Jayasuriya (eds.), *The Dynamics of Economic Policy Reform in South-east Asia and the South-west Pacific*, Wyd. Oxford University Press, 1992.; C. Baker, *A Short Account of the Rise and Fall of the Thai Technocracy*, Unpublished draft manuscript 2009.; N. Hamilton-Hart, *Banking Systems a Decade After the Crisis*, [w:] A. MacIntyre, T. Pempel, J. Ravenhill (eds.), *Crisis as Catalyst: Asia’s Dynamic Political Economy*, Wyd. Cornell University 2008, s. 45–69.; L. Stifel, *Technocrats and Modernization in Thailand*, „Asian Survey“ 1976, vol 16, nr 12, s. 1184–1196.; J. Bresnan, *Managing Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy*, Wyd. Columbia University Press 1993.; R. Tirto Sudarmo, *Indonesia and Nigeria, 1965-1985: Structural factors, technocracy and the politics of rural development*, Paper prepared for the first plenary meeting of Tracking Development Leiden, 25-28 June 2008.

as a result of authoritarian model of technocratic modernization, principles of personal success, career and consumption were implanted in the country, new “Chilean mentality” (combination of individualism, dynamism and competitiveness) was implemented into life; predominance of economic liberties over art and political liberties was ensured, and the project of “guarded democracy” was created³⁹. Similar forceful plan of authoritarian and technocratic modernization was partially implemented in Spain (1959–1973), Greece (1950–1973), Brazil (1968–1973)⁴⁰, Turkey (in the 2nd half of the 20th century)⁴¹, Ghana (after revolution of 1981)⁴².

Secondly, a specific variant of combination of technocratic governance and modernization nowadays (and in last decades) is demonstrated by China. The point is, that one cannot determine technocratic governance in China as the one, which promotes modernization. At present, there is no united approach towards the interpretation of the causes for modernization tendencies in China: one group of scientists assume, that China has challenged current western model of the world order⁴³; another group of researchers prove, that “prolonged stagnation” is still continuing in China and economic prosperity will not be considered a steady one, till the main principles of democracy and rule of law are not determined. It is obvious, that the notion of “the Chinese model” (which cannot be named an “economic miracle”) also requires strict determination in the context of modern conditions, which is realized on the patterns of “capitalistic authoritarianism” that “rationalizes tyranny” under the guise of local traditions and culture. Crucial modern characteristics of such a model: coexistence of economic modernization and nondemocratic policy; state control over “key positions” of economy (what is not peculiar of technocratic modernization in general); economic governance “from top downward”; gradual (additional) reforms in various spheres; “Confucian variant” of correlation between leaders and followers (people have the “obligation to submit”, and legitimacy of authority is based on its ability to bring benefits to people); connection with democratic centralism; the idea that development is not possible without stability. The problem is complicated by the fact, that the Chinese model is not monolithic. In other words, since the 80s of the 20th century, several Chinese models can be distinguished: experimental ascending agrarian reform after 1978; economic decentralization and its partial political liberalization in the 80s of the

³⁹ C. Huneeus, Technocrats and Politicians in an Authoritarian Regime: The ‘ODEPLAN Boys’ and the ‘Gremialists’ in Pinochet’s Chile, „Journal of Latin American Studies” 2000, vol 32, nr 2, s. 461–501.; P. Silva, In the name of reason: technocrats and politics in Chile, Wyd. Penn State Press 2008.; P. Silva, State, Public Technocracy and Politics in Chile, 1927-1941, „Bulletin of Latin American Research” 1994, vol 13, nr 3, s. 281–297.; P. Silva, Technocrats and Politics in Chile: From the Chicago Boys to the CIEPLAN Monks, „Journal of Latin American Studies” 1991, vol 23, nr 2, s. 385–410.; P. Silva, Towards Technocratic Mass Politics in Chile? The 1999-2000 Elections and the ‘Lavín Phenomenon’, „European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies” 2001, vol 70, s. 25–39.; P. Silva, The State and Capital in Chile: Business Elites, Technocrats, and Market Economics, Wyd. Westview Press 1996.

⁴⁰ R. Kaufman, Industrial Change and Authoritarian Rule in Latin America: A Concrete Review of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model, [w:] D. Collier (ed.), The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1979, s. 165–253.

⁴¹ U. Akçay, Technocrats in Power?, Prepared for „The State in Capitalist Society, 40 Years On” conference, 22 May 2009.; P. Donmez, Understanding Depoliticisation as Process and Governing Strategy in the Turkish Context, Wyd. University of Warwick 2010.

⁴² D. Moore, Development Discourse as Hegemony: Towards an Ideological History – 1945–1995, [w:] D. Moore, G. Schmitz (eds.), Debating Development Discourse: Institutional and Popular Perspectives, Wyd. Macmillan 1995, s. 1–53.

⁴³ A. Subramanian, The Inevitable Superpower, „Foreign Affairs” 2011, vol 90, nr 5, s. 66–78.

20th century; repressiveness and intensification of control after the Tiananmen Square protests; reformation of the state enterprises at the end of the 90s in the 20th century; the idea that “it is nice to be rich” (creation of many small and medium enterprises); egalitarian and socially-oriented construction of “scientific development”; the trend, that “the state sector moves forward and the private sector moves backwards”. It means, that from one stage to another the increase in technocratic constituent of governance in China is observed. But it leads not only to modernization, but rather to formation of the antimodel of coherent economic approach, which legitimizes cultural relativity and exclusiveness, and emphasizes national and state sovereignty. All this proves, that the Chinese model of authoritarian and technocratic governance does not fully conform to modernization expansion, as very often the question is in the ability of the Communist party to adapt to the changes⁴⁴.

Thirdly, not all democratic and authoritarian political regimes, which approve technocratic governance, undergo modernization. Especially, it can be observed in the case of authoritarian political regimes, as usually democratic political regimes are modernized (as it is proved by the statistical data). Often, the idea of technocratic governance is used only to create the guise (“cover”) for reforms, and for stabilization of authoritarian regime itself. In this case “survival” of authoritarian regimes is influenced by their sematic emulative nature, when the elections are held and the semblance of representativity is created, but in fact the country develops in accordance with the patterns of submission and “moderate repressiveness”. Taking this into consideration, technocratic governance as the idea of retaining the power is in the focus of leaders of nearly all authoritarian regimes, as the motto of modernization serves as the grounds for additional legitimization of political authority. At the same time, in fact political leaders of some countries have not possessed and do not have even now any scientific data concerning the directions and levels of modernization with the help of technocratic governance. They just appeal to the experience of the countries, which under the conditions of authoritarianism appeared to be rather successful, but do not implement in practice those mechanisms and steps, which are taken for comparison. The classic examples of the states, which make use of technocratic governance as the guise for retaining their political power, are some post-Soviet authoritarian regimes in Europe and Asia, in particular Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia etc.⁴⁵. They approved the

⁴⁴ Y. Huang, Rethinking the Beijing Consensus, „Asia Policy” 2011, vol 11, s. 1–26.; L. Cheng, L. White, China’s Technocratic Movement and the World Economic Herald, „Modern China” 1991, vol 17, nr 3, s. 342–388.; L. Cheng, L. White, Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy, „The China Quarterly” 1990, vol 121, s. 1–35.; X. Zang, The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?, „Asian Survey” 1993, vol 33, nr 8, s. 787–803.

⁴⁵ One can observe here some Soviet and post-Soviet causality. The countries, which have been analyzed, are the former republics of the Soviet Union, which is usually spoken of as the crucial moment of technocratic governance. For instance, the Soviet leader L. Brezhnev had technical education and in 1986, 90% of members of the Political Bureau were engineers. Such a practice was mainly implemented in the authoritarian countries, which exist on the USSR’s ruins. Moreover, nowadays the idea of technocratic governance is called “communist”: “working class is in power, and administration is carried out by experts”. The point is that, the ideas of technocracy and authoritarianism are considered to be adjacent ones or parallel (the notable is the experience of China). As a result of this, the idea of electivity is denied, and the emphasis is made on the “quality” of the appointed officials. However, such interpretation of technocratic governance is not a guarantee for organizational effectiveness. Moreover, one speaks rather of “pseudotechnocratic” governance, which results in establishment and realization of the question, concerning “preservation” of political regimes and exclusion of elements of ideological opposition. In fact, it is revealed in the fact, that under “pseudotechno-

postulate, that accelerated democracy is not possible because of the weakness of the civil society in the USSR, and as a result leads to chaos, and decided to move in the authoritarian direction, often swerving from ideology and policy. Thus, it is very often stated, that within authoritarian regimes different specific models of technocratic/non-party governance, which are based on the complete isolation of “government” from social groups’ interests, have been implemented. This idea has become a precursor for the postulate, concerning rationality of “technocratic and modernization authoritarianism” in the post-Soviet world⁴⁶.

However, in fact modernization has not occurred or it has been extremely limited. First of all, the efficient combination of effective and productive bureaucratic apparatus and mechanisms and patterns of authoritarian regimes functioning has not been ensured. Secondly, military and bureaucratic plan of authoritarian modernization in the post-Soviet countries has appeared to be not very efficient: to modernize the regime, military or law enforcement systems must initially rise in opposition to the former regime or the former stage of regime development⁴⁷. And in modern authoritarian regimes in the post-Soviet countries this constituent is the guise for business-projects. Thirdly, technocratic modernization on the basis of single-party predominance is non-prospective in the context of autocracies among the post-Soviet countries. The point is that, there is not a single party, which being authoritatively-authoritarian, would be able or at least just try to conduct successful social and economic transformations⁴⁸ (to the least extent it touches the party “New Azerbaijan”, YAP). Neither administrative machine, nor political leaders of the country, who prefer support of the current authoritarian mechanism of relations between the state and the party, is interested in this. It is notable, that the “United Russia” (ER) has not become the leading channel for recruiting administrative elite: today it is filled up only by means of patronage and clientistic relations. That is why, even if the Kremlin orders the ruling party to conduct the “course of modernization” by means of party structures, it will appear that the party does not have any own levers of pressure on society and administrative apparatus⁴⁹. Inclusion of technocratic and non-party governance in the post-Soviet authoritarian regimes has not led to their modernization and due to the fact that basic principles of modernization have not been implemented⁵⁰: system orientation on achievement of goals aimed at social-economic and political development, active industrial and regional policy, intensive

cratic” governance, non-party ministers, who would have to be the experts or technocrats, are “people, who belong both to the world of governance and the world of business”. See: L. Graham, *The Ghost of the Executed Engineer: Technology and the Fall of the Soviet Union*, Wyd. Cambridge 1993, s. 73–74.

⁴⁶ V. Hel'man, *Vozvrashchenie Levafana? Politika retsentralizatsiyi v sovremennoy Rossiyi*, „Polis” 2006, vol 2, s. 90–109.; G. Holsow, *Elektoral'nyy avtoritarizm v Rossiyi*, „Pro et Contra” 2008, vol 12, nr 1, s. 22–35.

⁴⁷ B. Taylor, *Russia's Passive Army: Rethinking Military Coups*, „Comparative Political Studies” 2001, vol 34, nr 8, s. 924–952.; O. Kryshтанovskaya, *Rezhym Putina: liberal'naya militokratiya?*, „Pro et Contra” 2002, vol 7, nr 4, s. 158–180.; M. Afanas'ev, *Rossiyskiye elity razvitiya: zapros na noviy kurs*, Moskva 2009.

⁴⁸ V. Hel'man, *Perspektivy dominiruyushchey partiyi v Rossiyi*, „Pro et Contra” 2006, vol 10, nr 4, s. 62–71.; A. Homberh, *Evolutsiya v usloviyakh dyktatury*, „Pro et Contra” 2008, vol 12, nr 1, s. 46–61.

⁴⁹ V. Hel'man, *Politicheskiye partiyi v Rossiyi: ot konkurentsii – k yerarkhiyi*, „Polys” 2008, vol 5, s. 135–152.

⁵⁰ O. Haman-Holutvyna, *Avtoritarizm razvitiya ili avtoritarizm bez razvitiya: sud'by modernizatsiyi na post-sovetskom prostranstve*, „Vesnyk MHIMO” 2010, vol 4, s. 77–84.

development of science and education, stimulation on the basis of the meritocratic principles of vertical mobility, formation of appropriate institutional infrastructure. However, the following features have been revealed: weakness of function of strategic aiming; unjustified and irrational strengthening of sectoral and regional disproportions; neglect of the meritocratic principles of vertical mobility; predominance in discourse of old-fashioned ideas, concerning relationship between economic and social factors in the state governance; non-optimal correlation between civilian and national interests in the processes of state policy formation; corruptive nature of the administrative system as the characteristic of system formation. And it despite the economic growth, which is just a ground for interpretation of some post-Soviet countries as the countries of “authoritarian industrialism” (as in case with China). The point is, that economic growth without development of the quality of people’s potential is not modernization. All this absolutely proves the conclusion, that in most authoritarian regimes of the former Soviet Union technocratic and modernization projects failed.

The key reasons for non-effective correlation between technocratic/non-party governance and prospects of modernization in the post-Soviet countries are: low quality of technocratic governance and the absence of complete comprehension of this process itself; deficiency of stimuli for conduction of successive course of modernization; shortage of agreement on the side of agents of regime stability (law enforcement agencies/military men, bureaucratic apparatus, dominating party etc.); absence of effective bureaucratic apparatus; absence of wide state autonomy and isolation of bureaucrats from the influence of groups of special interests; insubordination of bureaucracy to the state leaders, and its concernment not in long-term effectiveness of work, but in short-term officials’ political loyalty; fear of strict and fundamental transformations; maximization of hierarchal control in the system of governance, which leads to decrease in administration efficiency; process of hidden “profilisation” of political decision-taking process on the basis of “primary interests” predominance; weakness of modernization values and goals in the structures of various motivational characteristics of elites; predominance of clientistic relations in the system of elite formation, neglect of the meritocratic principles of governance⁵¹.

But theoretically, one should not neglect the variant, when the majority of political elite is interested in real modernization reforms, and not in populist rhetoric, when it has sufficient competence for their implementation, whereas authoritarian regime can create factual grounds for realization of positive social and political changes, promote concentration of social resources and efficiency of governance. When authoritarian political regime is established by the ruling elite, which is not interested in real technocratic modernization, then “modernization appeals” will be used as the guise for achievement of other goals. The problem is, that every authoritarian regime uses technocratic and modernization rhetoric, but not every authoritarian regime implements it in practice.

⁵¹ R. Brym, V. Gimpelson, The Size, Composition, and Dynamics of the Russian State Bureaucracy in the 1990s, „Slavic Review” 2004, vol 63, nr 1, s. 90–112.; P. Evans, D. Raukh, Byurokratiya i ekonomicheskiy rost: mezhranovoy analiz vozdeystviya „veberianyzatsiy” hosudarstvennogo apparata na ekonomicheskiy rost, „Ekonomicheskaya sotsiologiya” 2006, vol 7, nr 1, s. 38–60.

To conclude, it should be mentioned, that technocratic governance may promote political, social and economic modernization only in case, when there is synthesis of politics and technocracy within the frames of a certain political system. However, not in a wide sense, that is, as a result of combination of technocratic and political/ideological governance principles, but in a narrow one, when politics, in the context of institutions, regimes and states, requires technocracy for complex/effective elaboration of political process, implementation of reliable political choice (especially in the light of modernization and reformations), and besides enforcement of all expert decisions; and technocracy, as governance of experts-technocrats, requires politics, particularly sanctions of authority, just to be heard, not mentioning its productive and efficient usage (in the light of adherence to the process of modernization and reformation). In other words, technocratic governance can promote social, political and economic modernization only in case, when it is predetermined for this and is chosen by politicians, (political regime) and is also supported and encouraged by the latter. On the contrary, technocratic governance does not contribute to modernization in case, when it is fully used as a mechanism of retention of power, its stabilization or embedment of a political regime, as an instrument of achieving the goals, set by a political regime and only then the goals of reformation and modernization. If the process of technocratic governance is isolated from the system pressure (from the part of a political regime), interference and functions “without fear and affection”, then in prospects it has more chances to promote social, economic and political modernization. But if the process of technocratic governance is coopted as an inner-system phenomenon of political regime and is applied as its “guise”, then the chances to conduct successful reforms and modernization lower. One more empirical conclusion is that the technocratic model of modernization appeared to be successful mainly in those countries, where the positions of the heads of the states are rather powerful, who (even in accordance with the constitution) have the rights to form the governmental cabinets. These are usually classical presidential republics, more rarely absolute monarchies.

Along with this, it should be stated, that technocratic governance, under the conditions of parliamentary or non-parliamentary ways of government formation and application of various constitutional systems of governance in different types of political regimes (democratic and non-democratic), immanently prevents political modernization. The point is that, the main danger of technocratic governance is, that it “limits” a democratic demand, regarding the problem, that people must choose those officials, who conduct executive power (i.e. governance). That is why, the governments of the technocratic type a priori are not determined as those, which “run for” the certain position. Thus, it often happens, that technocratic modernization of social and economic processes in a certain country can go on along with the limitation of institutionalizing process of democracy, which is revealed in deviation from the classical rule, according to which “people elect people”.

That is why, the conclusion about theoretical principles and empirical experience of relationship between technocratic governance and modernization is that this relationship can have both positive and negative consequences. Positive results are short-term, and negative results are long-term. It means, that if technocratic government is created with the aim of getting out the country of political or economic crisis or contributing to its modernization, then it will likely to have positive effect on the process of governance in the country. But when technocratic governments become traditional and steady, it undermines the idea of democratic governance, accountability and political responsibility, leads to personalization of political process, as well as to institutionalization of patronage.

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